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Rural opposition to Francoism  
The peasantry has been often identified as a heterogeneous, conservative 
and politically apathetic social group. Their demands have been considered 
as pre-political, individualistic and millenarian. Moreover, it was assumed 
that the peasantry was a group destined to disappear with the advance of 
modernity. Recently, however, several studies have thoroughly reconsidered 
and overcome these conceptions.2 In the historiography of the Franco 
regime, particularly surrounding the theme of political change, numerous 
studies have correctly highlighted the key role of the popular classes in 
explaining the end of the dictatorship: especially the industrial working 
class, but also the role of neighbourhood movements, students, professionals 
and intellectuals. Despite this trend, rural social agents and their interaction 
with the regime and their role in its downfall have often been ignored. Only 
recently, a few researchers have begun to pay attention to the dynamics of 
conflict in rural Spain, highlighting its role as a democratizing force for 
wider social sectors, a fact that resolutely influenced the overall process of 
political change.3 
                                                
1 This paper is part of the HAR 2012-31431 project in which the author participates with a 
scholarship from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain. E-mail: 
cristian.ferrer@uab.cat. 
2 For classical studies on the peasantry see HOBSBAWM, Eric J. Rebeldes primitivos: 
estudios sobre las formas arcaicas de los movimientos sociales en los siglos XIX y XX. 
Barcelona: Ariel, 1983. A critique of Hobsbawm may be found in GONZÁLEZ DE 
MOLINA, Manuel. “Los mitos de la modernidad y la protesta campesina. A propósito de 
Rebeldes Primitivos de Eric J. Hobsbawm”. Historia Social, vol. 25, 1996, pp. 113-157. 
3 Probably the best book on the role of the new social movements during Francoism and the 
transition to democracy is DOMÈNECH, Xavier. Cambio político y movimiento obrero 
bajo el franquismo: lucha de clases, dictadura y democracia (1939-1977). Madrid: Icaria, 
2012. Some pioneering studies on the peasantry and rural areas during the political change 
are HERRERA, Antonio. La construcción de la democracia en el campo (1975-1988): el 
sindicalismo agrario socialista en la Transición española. Madrid: MAGRAMA, 2007 and 
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These few studies have offered the first results about rural social 
conflicts in predominantly agricultural regions, often where large landed 
estates and wage labour predominated. Yet there is still a lack of analysis 
about rural areas on the periphery of the main industrial areas such as 
Catalonia where there was a clear predominance of smaller family farms 
that coexisted with other types of landownership and employment 
opportunities that prefigured a great complexity in the social relationships of 
the region. Many small peasant landholders also supplemented their 
incomes as wage earners in the large rice plantations and were also attracted 
by the better salaries of industrial work in the factories located near the 
countryside. Moonlighting was thus common, aggravating the 
precariousness of living off small land holdings. In addition, a determining 
factor in social conflicts was the organizational maturity of the Catalan 
political opposition to the Franco regime in general. Catalan society, 
especially in the industrial belt of Barcelona, but not exclusively, was 
increasingly mobilized and developed a rich associative structure as it grew 
in the decade before the end of the regime. So much so that by the early 
1970s, the Catalan anti-Francoist movement had already established the first 
unified action platform of the Spanish opposition, the Assemblea de 
Catalunya (Assembly of Catalonia). Without doubt, then, a study of the 
Catalan rural periphery may help us to fully understand the complexity of 
post-Francoist political change, as much in Catalonia as in Spain.  
                                                                                                                        
MARTÍN, Óscar J. A tientas con la democracia: movilización, actitudes y cambio en la 
provincia de Albacete, 1966-1976. Madrid: Catarata, 2008.  
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This paper analyses social conflicts in southern Catalonia, 
specifically the regions of Lower Ebro and Montsià, both located on the 
mouth of the Ebro River in the province of Tarragona [Figure 1].4 These 
conflicts were carried out by rural wage workers and proletarianized small 
farmers who were able to resist and to challenge almost permanently the 
Francoist agents in the region and, as we shall see, they had a direct impact 
on weakening the local powers of the dictatorship. Apparently calm, the 
peasantry was, however, suffering the unwelcome consequences of the so-
called developmentalist political economy of the 1960s: impoverishment, 
proletarianization, higher taxation, the necessity to migrate, etc. This led to 
conflicts not primarily centred on the property of land itself, but on control 
of the means of production and the final product of the peasants’ labour. 
Franco’s Nuevo Estado (New State) claimed to be the guarantor of “social 
peace” so strictly labour conflicts necessarily became larger political 
struggles, as the latter were defined as crimes in Francoist Spain. Thereby, 
                                                
4 An important part of the source material constituting this paper is from FERRER 
GONZÁLEZ, Cristian. Lluitadors quotidians: L’antifranquisme, el canvi politic i la 
construcció de la democràcia al Montsià (1972-1979). Lleida: UdL, 2014, pp. 48-51, 67-82 
and 91-93. Nevertheless, most of the documentary sources used here are unpublished. 
Figure 1:  Map of the Lower Ebro Region 
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workers learned how to challenge the regime while they were gradually 
defining and increasing what was and what was not possible under the 
dictatorship. Peasant struggles were a useful political learning process for 
those involved, but they also extended beyond rural workers themselves. 
Indeed, since the late 1960s peasants had become the social and political 
vanguard of anti-Francoism in villages on the lower Ebro, mobilizing huge 
segments of the rural population. 
 
2. From the notion of injustice to organized protest 
In 1966, the government approved a new Seguridad Social Agraria 
(Agrarian Social Security policy, hereafter SSA). As a result, farmers who 
employed wageworkers, legally identified as “agricultural entrepreneurs”, 
were required to pay a tax. With the objective of avoiding the development 
of a black market economy, the government calculated the entrepreneur’s 
tax for the SSA by a theoretical count of the labour needed to work a farm, 
based on its size instead of the actual number of wage workers employed. 
This policy demonstrated a profound ignorance of labour in agriculture. 
Small and mid-sized farms did not utilize wage work, relying instead on the 
family unit. The SSA tax was thus perceived as deeply unfair because it 
forced farmers to pay workers that, in fact, did not exist. In addition, from 
the 1950s onwards family farms ceased to produce for home consumption 
and were completely integrated in the capitalist market. Thereafter family 
farms became dependent on the marketing of the agricultural industry and 
the new social intermediaries that would arise to perform this function. 
Many families were not able to maintain production at a sufficient level to 
cope with high taxes and debts. Many of them began to work in regional 
industries or they migrated to the big cities. Competition in the labour 
market became a necessity in the struggle to survive. Many small farmers 
were forced to make large investments to maximize their production and a 
significant number decided to sell or lease their lands to their more fortunate 
neighbours who had not opted to migrate.5 
                                                
5 ALONSO, V. L., et. al. Crisis agrarias y luchas campesinas, 1970-1976. Madrid: Ayuso, 
1976, pp. 41-54; RIQUER, Borja de. Historia de España. La dictadura de Franco. vol. 9, 
Barcelona: Crítica, 2010, pp. 624-627; SIMPSON, James. La agricultura española (1765-
1965): la larga siesta. Madrid: Alianza, 1997, pp. 321-347; SABIO, Alberto. “Cultivadores 
de democracia. Politización campesino y sindicalismo agrario progresista en España (1970-
1980)”, Historia Social, vol. 38, 2006, pp. 75-102, especially pp. 76-77; Interview with 
T.M. (s.a. [1976-77]): peasant trade unionist, in: BENELBAS, León, et al. Unió de 
Pagesos: el sindicat del camp. Barcelona: Alternativa, 1977, pp. 197-199. 
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Previous studies have alerted us that the perception of injustice 
involves a central attribution of responsibility. Yet, the subjectivity of a 
political grievance process also develops within a broader interpretive 
framework of shared identity that is essential to provide an organized 
response. According to E. P. Thompson: 
 [...] these grievances operated within a popular 
consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate 
practices [...]. This in turn was grounded upon a consistent 
traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper 
economic functions of several parties within the community, 
which, taken together, can be said to constitute “the moral 
economy of the poor”. An outrage to these moral assumptions, 
quite as much as actual deprivation, was the usual occasion for 
direct action.6  
However, any action also requires what Klandermans calls a 
“motivational framework” involving the creation and dissemination of 
beliefs about the effectiveness of collective action. And along with the 
grievance itself this is one of the keys to the social construction of protest. 
Cabana summarizes this as follows “when potential participants in a social 
movement think strategies and collective actions are useful to change a 
situation and to reduce its uneasiness, it is when a link between discomfort 
and the behaviour of protest exists”.7 Since the late 1960s, many sectors of 
southern Catalan peasants demonstrated that they felt part of a common 
social body (the peasantry, rural people) with common problems. They 
perceived the regime’s agrarian policy as illegitimate and an attempt to 
destroy their way of life. In addition, news of the victories and successes 
from more mobilized regions, especially the triumph of the Workers’ 
Commissions in the main industries in 1966, where, in fact, some of those 
who immigrated worked, led some peasants to “defend with our hands our 
interests, which coincide with the general democratic interests of our 
people”.8 Indeed, some decided to join the Comissions de Pagesos (Peasants 
Commissions, hereafter CCPP) in the struggle against the perspective that 
                                                
6 THOMPSON, Edward Palmer. Costumbres en común. Barcelona: Crítica, 1995, p. 216. 
7 CABANA, Ana. La derrota de lo épico. Valencia: PUV, 2013, p. 53. On the “frameworks 
theory” see KLANDERMANS, Bert. The Social Psychology of protest. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997. 
8 Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya (hereafter ANC), PSUC collection, Extractes de documents 
de la Coordinadora de Comissions de Pagesos del Camp de Catalunya, s.a. [1968], sig. 
1552, p. 2. For the workers movement in the Barcelona metropolitan area, see 
DOMÈNICH, Xavier. Clase obrera, antifranquismo y cambio político: pequeños grandes 
cambios, 1956-1969. Madrid: Catarata, 2008. 
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“little farmers soon will be wage-workers for intermediaries who eat our 
fruit like they want to”.9 
The political demands and methods displayed by the CCPP in 
Catalonia arose from the customs of the “little everyday rebellions” of the 
peasantry, by consolidating an action that some of them were already 
practicing, because it was one of “the most felt claims [...] by peasants and 
land workers”: that is, a coordinated boycott against the SSA tax.10 Actions 
like the denial to pay a tax are easy to repress by the state unless they count 
on massive popular support. In a village in Lerida province, in inner 
Catalonia, twenty-nine peasants were arrested in 1972 and their properties 
were confiscated. This event provoked solidarity by wide sectors of urban 
and rural society, the boycott was extended and the regime was forced to 
drop the charges against the prisoners. Mobilizations against the SSA tax in 
the Lower Ebro and Montsià, with the always-present agrarian 
unemployment problem, produced demonstrations of over five hundred 
rural workers in April 1971 and once again in 1972. Despite the repression 
suffered, the regime was not able to counter the widespread boycott and the 
Spanish government was forced to exempt small family farms from the tax 
in 1973.11 
                                                
9 Arxiu Històric de la Comissió Obrera Nacional de Catalunya (hereafter AHCONC), 
Clandestine press, “La necessitat de la Reforma Agrària”, Camp: Portaveu de les 
Comissions de Pagesos de Catalunya, n. 2, s.a. [September-October of 1969], reg. 00/97, 
top. 0159C015. It provides information about the emulation of the urban mobilizations by 
people in the lower Ebro. See the interviews of J.V.E. (July 26, 2012): student, socialist, 
non-tenured professor; E.E.M. (June 3, 2013): agronomist student, peasant and trade 
unionist; E.T.A. (June 17, 2013): student, worker, communist; AHCONC, interview of 
C.L.S. (October 22, 1998 – February 18, 1999): communist interviewed by Javier Tébar, 
and interview of J.S. (s.a. [1976-77]): peasant and trade unionist, in: BENELBAS, León, et. 
al. Unió de Pagesos: el sindicat del camp Op.Cit.,. pp. 201-202. Also consult the 
pioneering study on influence of mobilization, the “political mirror”, in MARTÍN, Óscar J. 
A tientas con la democracia… Op.Cit.  pp. 172-182 and 226-234. 
10 About “little everyday rebellions”, see YUSTA, Mercedes. Guerrilla y resistencia 
campesina: la resistencia armada contra el franquismo en Aragón (1939-1952). Zaragoza: 
PUZ, 2003, pp. 15-25, quote on p. 18. For a classic study of peasant resistance, see SCOTT, 
James C. Los dominados y el arte de la resistencia. Tafalla: Txalaparta, 2003. Next quote 
from ANC, PSUC collection, Extractes de… sig. 1552, p. 2. We may see the importance of 
the boycott to SSA tax in AHCONC, Clandestine press, “Continua el problema de la 
Seguretat Social”, Camp: Portaveu de les Comissions de Pagesos de Catalunya, n. 3, s.a. 
[November-December of 1969], reg. 00/97, top. 0159C015. For a study about conflicts 
around the SSA tax, see CABANA, Ana and LANERO, Daniel. “Movilización social en la 
Galicia rural del Tardofranquismo (1960-1977)”, Historia Agraria, vol. 48, 2009, pp. 111-
132. 
11 Read a letter sent to the press by peasants of Artesa de Lleida in solidarity with the 
twenty-nine arrested in Albatárrech: “Las cuotas de la Seguridad Social Agraria”, La 
Vanguardia Española, May 10, 1972. The mobilizations in Amposta and its effect on the 
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The CCPP of the Lower Ebro participated in this massive struggle 
that involved heterogeneous social sectors with, for example, 50% of the 
population working as wage labourers. Many of these, however, also “had 
their piece of land with one or two jornales12 where they planted what was 
essential for the winter, but they all lived working the land of others”. Many 
of them also participated in Christian social movements that would inspire 
the CCPP’s discourse. Others came from a socialist political culture and, 
especially, anarcho-syndicalism, which was very present in the region 
before the civil war. But the major political group in the CCPP were, 
undoubtedly, the communists of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya 
(Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia, hereafter PSUC), who constituted the 
most active and organized peasants in Francoist Spain. The very strong 
presence of wageworkers with a radical political rhetoric hindered the 
CCPP’s relationship with less politicized sectors. In addition to the slogans 
of the PSUC that differentiated wageworkers from peasants, although the 
party later rejected them, led the CCPP to have serious difficulties 
mobilizing non-communist sectors.13 However, it was repression that 
smashed the possibility of the consolidation of the CCPP’s. As a result of 
the State of Emergency declared by the regime in 1969, the leadership of the 
PSUC in the region was dismantled and peasant activists were forced to 
organize strictly clandestinely for some time.  
 
3. Redefining the possible: transforming the given framework 
Despite the CCPP’s difficulties, it was able to channel the demands 
of the peasantry to control the structures of the Sindicato Vertical, the 
official Francoist trade union, known as the “Brotherhood” in the 
countryside. The CCPP represented a synthesis of the two dominant 
varieties of Catalan trade unionism that had originated in the 1930s: on the 
one hand, “reformist” trade unionism with actions like infiltration in the 
                                                                                                                        
SSA tax may be found in MAYAYO, Andreu. De pagesos a ciutadans: cent anys de 
sindicalisme i cooperativisme agraris a Catalunya, 1893-1994. Barcelona: Afers, 1995, pp. 
199-210; ANC, PSUC collection, Primera Conferència del Comité Intercomarcal Baix 
Ebre-Montsià del PSUC, 1978, sig. 5444, p. 6; Arxiu Històric Provincial de Tarragona 
(hereafter AHPT), Cámara Oficial Sindical Agraria of Tarragona collection, Libro de Actas, 
March 15, 1973, sig. 58, p. 12. 
12 In Spanish “jornal” means “daily salary”, but it is also an ancient land measure 
equivalent to about 4,080 square metres, a term still used by the peasantry.  
13 First quote in: interview of E.T.A. (June 17, 2013). Interviews of P.F.M. (June 4, 2013): 
shepherd, labourer and socialist; J.S. (s.a. [1976-77]): peasant trade unionist, in 
BENELBAS, León, et. al. Unió de pagesos...Op.Cit.,  pp. 201-202. ANC, PSUC collection, 
Acuerdos de la Primera Asamblea General de las Comisiones Obreras Agrícolas y 
Campesinas, May 1970, sig. 1552, pp. 2-3.  
46! Popular*empowerment,*peasant*struggles*and*political*change:*southern*Catalonia*under*late*francoism*(1968S1976)**
 
 
official trade unions and raising legal grievances with the Francoist 
authorities; and on the other hand, “revolutionary” trade unionism, using 
unlawful means like the strike or the boycott, classified as crimes and 
severely punished by the dictatorship.14 Indeed, peasants started a struggle 
for official trade union control even before the industrial working class had 
launched a similar campaign in 1966. Open activism, assemblies and regular 
confrontations with the Francoist trade union personnel produced some of 
the first leaders of peasant activism. Such leaders gained recognition and 
respect that, in fact, helped to better the standard of living for the majority. 
Screaming “Long Live Democracy” and “Thieves, Go Home”, a growing 
number of peasants participated in the movement, and when their leaders 
would suffer repression, solidarity campaigns would serve to further 
consolidate the movement.15 
In the 1971 elections for the Workers’ Section in Amposta, six 
peasants in the opposition movement were elected.16 In spite of such partial 
victories, the leeway for advancement was narrow and the costs of 
repression were high. The Workers’ Section was not allowed to control the 
official trade union because of the impediments of Francoist labour law. 
Despite this, it was the one legal way to raise larger economic and political 
demands felt by the population. The dictatorship had imposed an unequal 
union structure on rural workers; landowners and big agrarian entrepreneurs 
enjoyed absolute and unquestioned power within official union structures, 
despite representing only 4.6% of its members. This inequality made it 
virtually impossible for the vast majority in the “producers’ section” to 
control the union. However, some mobilized peasants started to approach 
more well-off farmers asking them to organize a “democratic candidacy” 
together representing all wage workers, peasants and farmers in the anti-
Francoist movement. Their ultimate target would be control of the official 
trade union of each segment; but first they would strategically seek to win in 
                                                
14 ANC, PSUC collection, Extractes de documents… sig. 1552, p. 3. We may see how José 
Antonio Serrano Montalvo, the province’s civil governor, perceived the “subversive” 
peasant actions in Archivo General de la Administración (hereafter AGA), Ministry of 
Governance collection, Memoria del Gobierno Civil de Tarragona, 1968, sig. 52/00487. 
For more information about the “reformist” and “revolutionary” varieties of the CCPP, see: 
MAYAYO, Andreu. De pagesos a ciutadans…Op.Cit., pp. 197-199. 
15 ANC, PSUC collecton, Por una vida mejor, s.a. [1970], sig. 1552. See what has been 
called “the conquest of solidarity” in DOMÈNECH, Xavier. Quan el carrer va deixar de 
ser seu: moviment obrer, societat civil i canvi polític: Sabadell (1966-1976). Barcelona: 
Abadia de Montserrat, 2002, pp. 121-123. 
16 ANC, PSUC collection, Assemblea de la Coordinadora de les Comissions de Pagesos i 
Jornalers de Catalunya, December 5, 1971, sig. 1552, p. 1. 
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one area, the rice producers’ organization, the Cámara Arrocera, “the 
cooperative with the highest trading volume of Spain”.17 
The attempt to bring together the opposition vanguard and 
entrepreneurs who were opposed to corruption and greedy intermediaries 
was fraught with difficulties. In 1972, some communist peasants tried to 
construct an inter-class candidacy to take control of the Arrocera. Despite 
the apparent predisposition of some anti-Francoist entrepreneurs to join with 
their class enemies, it was difficult to convince communist peasants to ally 
with better off farmers with different political perspectives. As one activist 
in the campaign, Comrade R, noted:  up until “the last moment […] [they] 
lack[ed] help from the [PSUC’s] Local Committee and from the militant 
peasant base”.18 Yet the mobilization effort for the elections ended up 
encouraging the most active peasants to participate in the campaign. 
Despite open confrontations in the past, the majority of peasants and 
rural wage workers could still shelter themselves in the rhetorical 
concessions inherent to what Scott calls the “self-portrait of dominant 
elites” and elements of the dominant social discourse from the dictatorship: 
the falangist ideology. For the peasantry, rhetorical concessions offered a 
surprisingly large arena for political conflict by using a low-intensity 
discourse based on the “flattering self-image of the elites”, despite their 
actual defenceless situation against a possible open confrontation.19 Thus, 
the campaign to win the elections in the Arrocera was made openly and 
within the established legal framework. Peasant activists travelled the region 
with cars and megaphones, posted up over three hundred posters by all 
unions and cooperatives in the area, and organized for an agrarian 
entrepreneur candidate, well regarded by farmers and workers, to challenge 
the Francoist leadership of the cooperative.20 
The Arrocera’s president understood his power was in danger so he 
recruited over three hundred non-farmers as new members, especially city 
shopkeepers, with the promise to offer them low-interest loans from the 
Caja Rural, the rural Building Society, if they voted for him on the 
                                                
17 “El Bajo Ebro, en los inicios de un proceso de desarrollo económico”, La Vanguardia 
Española, October 26, 1972, p. 53. 
18 ANC, PSUC collection, Amposta: Junta General de la Cambra Arrossera, September 3, 
1972, sig. 1677, p. 1. 
19 SCOTT, James C. Los dominados…Op.Cit., p. 45. For a study on rhetorical “social 
justice” from the falangismo and Franco’s regime, see MOLINERO, Carme. La captación 
de las masas: política social y propaganda en el regimen franquista. Madrid: Cátedra, 
2005. 
20 ANC, PSUC collection, Handwritten pamphlet giving instructions on what posters should 
say and how many copies must be done, 1972, sig. 1677. 
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cooperative’s Board. Apparently, the President “coerced many farmers […], 
falsified ballots with the clumsy ploy to vote by delegation, […] he did not 
allow anyone talking during the session and he proved to be a 
troublemaker”. Despite the difficulties, the opposition candidacy won 30% 
of the votes. The President “went to the polling place with more than a 
thousand votes under his arm”,21 so it was not possible to defeat him in 
1972. However, the 30% electoral support encouraged the anti-Francoist 
movement in the region. 
Indeed, despite their partial defeat, a proof that the opposition 
campaign generated a heated political conflict was the repression that was 
soon organized by the Francoist supporters. The renovation of the Board 
assembly “awoke the interest of Ebro’s right wing […]. The meeting, that 
had started at 4 in the afternoon, [only] ended at midnight”. Punishment by 
Francoist personnel in the Cámara Arrocera came quickly and 136 
members “considered from the opposition” were “expelled from the 
Cámara” under the pretext of “refusing to register their whole land, 
including their family’s land which does not belong to the Cámara”. Such 
irregularities were reported by the press, but censorship was quite strict: “a 
peasant from Amposta sent a letter to the Correo Catalán, reporting the 
irregularities in the Cámara Arrocera”. However, “a month has passed and 
the letter has not yet been published”.22 
 
4. The expansion of the anti-Francoist social base 
In the same period as the peasants’ campaign in the Sindicato 
Vertical, the movement also began a process of contact with other sectors of 
workers. In a natural way, rural and industrial workers in villages met in 
bars; for those who were Christians and churchgoers, in church on Sundays; 
in cultural and recreational centres as well as amateur theatres. To sum up, 
they met in social spaces of all kinds. As Thompson wrote, “the chapel, the 
tavern and the home were their own”. We mean, in that sense, that these 
spaces were far from the main stage of the class struggle: far from the 
official trade unions, far from the cooperatives, far from the factories. 
Nevertheless, these spaces “were their own”. They were spaces that 
contributed to the contact and engagement between different political and 
                                                
21 Quotes in ANC, PSUC collection, Amposta: Junta General… sig. 1677, p. 2 and 
interview by E.T.A. (June 17, 2013). 
22 “La Cooperativa de la Cámara Arrocera renovó la mitad de su Junta”, La Vanguardia 
Española, September 8th of 1972, p. 28. ANC, PSUC collection, Amposta’s Local 
Committee informative to the PSUC’s Central Committee, October 10, 1973, sig. 1677. 
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cultural sensitivities. Activists met with other non-activists, and sharing 
anti-Francoist ideas, they created “safe spaces”. People hostile to the regime 
converged with peasants unconnected with the movement to begin an 
uninhibited exchange of opinions. It is hard to ascertain the extent and limits 
of such safe spaces, but we can affirm that sites of popular sociability were 
essential to connect activists, eventually contributing to united actions by 
social Christians, socialists, Marxists, social democrats, Christian 
democrats, communists, Catalan nationalists or people without any political 
affiliation in particular.23 
Recreational and cultural activities during these years were a good 
way to attract young people, then still unconnected with the opposition, to 
the anti-Francoist opposition. Concerts, recitals, expositions, cinema clubs, 
theatres, hiking clubs, and debates were activities that offered the possibility 
of popular involvement. Such activities contributed to the construction of a 
counterhegemonic culture. Faced with the impossibility of always 
constructing open political activities, cultural activism became the “bait” 
which allowed opposition movements to “channel alternatives formulated 
independently from the officialdom”.24 Civic and cultural associations 
opened tiny cracks that were used by anti-Francoist activists to open up 
spaces helping to build a dissident political culture that the regime had no 
doubt in calling “subversive”. Political dissent surpassed workplace 
relations and was expressed by expanded activity among the majority in the 
popular sectors, arriving, in the words of the Ministry of Labour Relations, 
to “collectives until now peaceful”. The dictatorship, on the other hand, was 
incapable of promoting an official culture related to their own interests 
despite counting on the full power of the state apparatus. Official culture 
was confined to staid commemorations such as the “Liberation of the 
Village as the National Crusade”.25 
                                                
23 Most of the interviewees attest to the importance of recreational association:  Interview 
by J.V.G. (July 3, 2013): cultural activist and worker trade unionist; J.A.B. (July 20, 2012): 
Christian and later socialist militant; J.L.M.M. (July 9, 2012): bank worker and Catalan 
separatist leftist; E.E.M. (June 2, 2013); E.T.A. (June 17, 2013); J.V.E. (July 26, 2012). I 
also wrote about this topic in FERRER GONZÁLEZ, Cristian. “Ulldecona i el canvi 
polític. Dictadura, contrahegemonia i democràcia (1964-1983)”, Raïls, vol. 30, 2014, pp. 7-
53. Thompson’s quote from THOMPSON, Edward Palmer. La formación de la clase 
obrera en Inglaterra. Madrid: Capitán Swing, 2013, p. 74. 
24 JAME, Antonieta. L’oposició al franquisme a Lleida. Lerida: Pagès, 1998, pp. 99-152, 
quote from p. 102; also see MARTÍN, Óscar J. A tientas con…Op.Cit., pp. 269-282 and 
FERRER GONZÁLEZ, Cristian. Lluitadors quotidians…Op.Cit., pp. 82-89. 
25 On “subversive” political culture, see the north Catalan case in AGA, Ministry of 
Governance collection, Memoria del Gobierno Civil de Gerona, 1976, sig. 32/11454, c. 5. 
Quote from MARTIN VILLA, Rodolfo. Al Servicio del Estado. Barcelona: Planeta, 1985 
[1st ed. 1984], p. 16. Institutional commemorations in AHPT, Public Order collection, 
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The expansion of the social base of the opposition developed beyond 
the cultural level. Indeed, spaces of popular sociability aided the process of 
galvanizing different sectors in larger opposition political movements. 
Moreover, following the example of the Assemblea de Catalunya, the rural 
workers’ movement gave up their sectarianism and started to build united 
actions. So much so that they definitively rejected the most sectarian 
ideological formulations of the CCPP organization, beginning to  
 […] organize collectively around the most essential 
demands of the peasantry as a whole and its demands for 
specific formulations in each region according to its 
peculiarities. The need to promote cadres and peasants to 
contribute to its development was also considered, as well as the 
extension of the network of peasant organizations to all of 
Catalonia that would be the basis of the peasant mobilization.26 
As a result of this operational shift, the rural workers’ movement 
created a new, more plural and less ideological socio-political movement 
that was able to unite the whole rural opposition: the Unió de Pagesos 
(Peasants’ Union, hereafter UP). Workers from southern Catalonia 
participated in its foundation. Some of them were linked to the PSUC, but 
there was also the obvious presence of socialists and Christian democrats. 
The UP was clearly a more plural organization than the CCPP. It arose 
among Ebro’s peasantry during the last year of the dictator Franco’s life. It 
demonstrated that it had the support of a civil society that had already 
created social spaces for oppositional ideas and politics. This was expressed 
for example in a relatively large demonstration – 500 people according to 
the organizers – on May 1, 1975 in front of the Cámara Arrocera 
demanding assistance against unemployment.27 
In the early summer of 1975, large assemblies were organized in the 
local branches of the official trade unions. They debated the precarious 
economic situation of families who lived off the land. In their opinion, it 
was the result of government policies. Indeed, the peasantry was not 
allowed to negotiate directly with the state, a situation equal to that of the 
industrial working class before the introduction of collective bargaining 
                                                                                                                        
Programa oficial de actos y festejos, Santa Bàrbara, May of 1976, sig. 2304; “National 
Crusade” is how fascists called the Spanish Civil War. 
26 ANC, PSUC collection, “Reunión de payeses de 16 comarcas de Cataluña”, 
Informaciones Campesinas, s.a. [November of 1974], sig. 1552, p. 1. 
27 Centre Documental de la Comunicació (hereafter CEDOC), Viladot collection, 
“Notícies”, La Terra, n. 1, July 1975, sig. 0689GF, p. 11. 
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agreements in 1958. The only option that rural workers had was to strike to 
generate enough pressure to win their demands, producing “collective 
bargaining by riot” in all branches of production. Only in this way could the 
workers minimize the repressive costs of the strike. Only in this way could 
they overflow the state capacity to repress the workers’ protest and force the 
state to, in the case of farmers, increase the price of agricultural products.28 
The price rise on the market was unstoppable yet what farmers received 
each year was lower than the previous year. As the harvesters complained: 
“canned tomato has increased in price […] except the price received by the 
farmer”.29 
Compensation to agrarian entrepreneurs that the regime had 
previously offered was disappearing because of the 1973 oil crisis. The 
dictatorship lost its base of support, the owners, and it was completely 
incapable of attracting the popular classes and neutralizing the growing 
“subversion”. The regime was in crisis and the opposition was united and 
self-assured. The 1975 trade union elections would be the definitive 
occasion to unseat the “false representatives”, while the real level of the 
opposition’s hegemony among workers and civil society could be verified. 
The main difference in respect to 1972 was that in 1975 “labourers and 
owners have come together for the first time […]; they have fought together 
helping to each other to clean up the Brotherhood of false representatives”. 
The opposition had the opportunity to meet and discuss in large assemblies 
“with frankness and freedom”, constructing a unitary programme to 
confront the local Francoists, before the elections. The list of candidates was 
horizontally chosen and the program was approved unanimously.30 
As in the 1972 elections for the Arrocera, pro-Francoists tried to buy 
the votes of labourers and owners, aiming to “stop the struggle that has been 
developing in the social sphere in the last years”. The President of the 
Arrocera President promoted his own candidates in both the labourers’ and 
owners’ sections of the trade union.  He took advantage of his position as 
President to use the locals of the cooperative for meetings and attempted to 
                                                
28 DOMÈNECH, Xavier. “La otra cara del milagro español. Clase obrera y movimiento 
obrero en los años del desarrollismo”, Historia Contemporánea, vol. 26, 2003, pp. 91-112. 
For the originS of the term “collective bargaining by riot”, see HOBSBAWM, Eric J. 
Trabajadores: estudios de la historia de la clase obrera. Barcelona: Crítica, 1979, pp. 16-
35. 
29 ANC, PSUC collection, “El campesino cobra hoy menos que en 1973”, Informaciones 
Campesinas, s.a. [November 1974], sig. 1552, p. 7. 
30 On Francoism’s crisis, see YSÀS, Pere. La crisis de la dictadura franquista. In: 
MOLINERO, Carme (ed.). La Transición, treinta años después. Barcelona: Península, 
2006. Quotes from CEDOC, Viladot collection, “Les eleccions sindicals a Amposta”, La 
Terra, n. 2, January 1976, sig. 0689GF, p. 4. 
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buy favours among the workers and owners using the members’ own 
money.  He wanted to guarantee his control of the official trade union 
control at any cost. Such despotic and authoritarian methods produced a 
double and contradictory effect: on one hand, the President dissuaded 
workers to take a vindictive attitude fearing sanctions —especially getting 
fired from work— and suffer political repression; on the other hand, he 
contributed to the radicalization of attitudes among more and more 
workers.31 However, the development of popular empowerment by the 
opposition made the difference: 
The vanguard of workers and employers of the 
democratic candidacies were at the door of the Brotherhood 
[Official Trade Union] at the time of the vote. They completely 
invalidated the [union] bosses —who were used to doing 
whatever they wanted at the Cámara. This time they were booed 
by workers and publicly denounced the coercion faced by the 
Cámara’s workers who were threatened with dismissal if they 
did not vote for him.32 
This time “democratic candidacies” won in every union section 
except among the landowners and the union administrative staff who were 
formed by personnel loyal to the President. The opposition victory 
reverberated beyond the world of labour relations. Many greeting cards 
were received by the union from shopkeepers after the democratic 
candidacies’ victory.33 It showed the degree of support garnered by the anti-
Francoist movement among civil society that had become aware of its own 
power as it worked together united with wider social sectors. 
 
5. The partial defeat of a strike and the success of many struggles: 
towards political change 
The success of the southern Catalan political opposition did not 
improve the living conditions of the peasantry. The horticultural sector had 
been the centre of agrarian development during the preceding years in the 
                                                
31 ANC, PSUC collection, Elecciones sindicales en Amposta, July 5, 1975, sig. 1677, p. 1. 
MOLINERO, Carme and YSÀS, Pere. Productores disciplinados y minorías subversivas: 
clase obrera y conflictividad laboral en la España franquista. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1998, p. 
226. 
32 ANC, PSUC collection, Elecciones… sig. 1677, p. 2. 
33 Arxiu Comarcal del Montsià (hereafter ACMO), Amposta’s Agrarian Chamber 
collection, Llibre de correspondència de l’entitat sindical, July 17, 1975, sig. 2243014, c. 
8. 
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Ebro region.34 But the canning industry exercised the monopoly of 
intermediation between the peasantry and the market. They earned most of 
the profits and their greed led to increases in the final price of products. This 
reduced the consumption capacity of the popular classes at a time of severe 
economic crisis.  
From 1973 onwards, Spanish peasants had initiated a wave of 
diverse conflicts to achieve an improved price for their products and, as was 
mentioned above, to minimize the possibility of repression. The “Pepper 
War”, for example, took place between October and November 1973. 
Thanks to massive popular support, it spread along the Ebro Valley, 
between Navarre and Aragon. 
In August 1975, Ebro’s Catalan peasants threatened a “tomato 
pickup” strike unless they received five pesetas per kilo as a minimum price. 
The so-called “Tomato War” had started in Navarre in the summer of 1973 
and it finished with a general rise in tomato prices for the farmers that year. 
However, inflation during 1974 decreased the real increase. Throughout 
1974 and 1975, several conflicts related to inflation and the inability to 
negotiate the production price of fruits and vegetables broke out: asparagus, 
peppers and tomatoes were the main crops in the conflict. The 40% decrease 
in exports to the European Community led to a decrease in demand for 
tomatoes by the canning industry since they were still using the stock of the 
previous year’s tomatoes. However, the peasantry was not ready to pay for a 
crisis that was not caused by them. While the prices of their products 
decreased, they noted a 30% increase in the profits of the seven main 
Spanish banks, prompting them to rhetorically question: “Who should 
tighten their belts?”35 
One democratic workers’ commission from the Amposta official 
trade union met with the Arrocera’s President in early August 1975. 
Workers aimed to control the profit margin from tomato harvesting. The 
mood was heated and there was no agreement. The next day more than 250 
harvesters met at the union offices and harshly criticized the canning 
industry that was, literally, ruining them. One of the constant and never 
satisfied demands of the peasant movement was to buy a cannery to 
                                                
34 “Marcha ascendente de la sección hortofrutícola”, La Vanguardia Española, September 
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35 ANC, PSUC collection, “Precios percibidos, coste de vida y beneficios bancarios”, 
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conserve the products they produced. The Arrocera’s President “satisfied” 
their demand at that moment by buying an outdated machine from his 
nephews’ bankrupt industry. They not only were unable to get a better price 
for their products, but also had to deal with the debt generated by the 
purchase of obsolete machinery. It was the straw that broke the camel’s 
back and “farmers agreed at the last meeting to stop the harvest in the 
coming days if they were not given the demanded price”.36 
From the first time in 37 years of dictatorship, the peasantry of the 
region took massive collection action through a strike. Picketers visited all 
tomato farms rebuking those who refused to obey the will of the majority 
expressed in the democratic assembly of August 8. Four days later, the 
strike appeared to have little chance of success despite the initial enthusiasm 
of the farmers. The Arrocera’s President took advantage of this situation 
during the weekend to make a bargain unfavourable to the harvesters, acting 
behind the cooperative’s members. A labourer rebuked the President at the 
assembly of August 11. The President, he said, “breaks the Cámara’s rules, 
he insults a member […] while he expels him from the meeting”. Over 240 
harvesters, 80% of the members, left the assembly in disgust. Despite this 
setback, the strike extended to southwestern Spain, in Extremadura, which 
went on strike from August 12 to 18. Harvesters in other provinces also 
struck and the action was reactivated in the north of the country. The 
Ministry of Agriculture, unable to repress such a widespread action, agreed 
to bargain with the peasantry and offered help to the sector. “Collective 
bargaining by riot” was thus the only way to force real negotiations. 
Moreover, media coverage contributed, undoubtedly, to expand solidarity 
between the peasants and the people.37 
In spite of the eventual tomato workers’ defeat in Catalonia by the 
hierarchies of the regime, the general mobilizing frame extended to several 
Spanish regions, indicating that the regime’s days in power were numbered. 
Franco’s death in November 1975 produced the perception that the 
dictatorship could be ended, provoking an increase in social mobilizations: 
industrial strikes, land occupations in the south and the participation in 
actions of “new” sectors until then “peaceful”. These months — from 
December 1975 to May 1976 — were crucial in avoiding the perpetuation 
                                                
36 “Los agricultores de Amposta, descontentos”, La Vanguardia Española, August 15, 
1975, p. 24. 
37 “Los ingresos de los agricultores de Amposta han disminuido en más de veinticinco 
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of Francoism beyond the dictator’s death.38 Popular empowerment was clear 
and inedited: in a country where strikes were prohibited, between 1973 and 
1976 Spain witnessed the largest number of labour conflicts in Europe in 
relation to the number of workers involved and the hours lost. Demands for 
democracy and amnesty for political prisoners and those in exile multiplied 
with the movements demanding to know if the new king Juan Carlos the 
First would form a government in benefit “of that immense majority, which 
is not silent but silenced”. The isolation of the dictatorship forced the regime 
to implement restricted reforms, which failed, making it necessary to 
embark on more ambitious reforms that were finally achieved through the 
general election in 1977. This would launch a political process that the 
opposition did not manage, but conditioned; and, finally, it forced the new 
regime to break with many of the past practices of the Francoist 
dictatorship. Despite the quantity of ink that has been spent on the 
“democratic will” of the king and the political staff of the former 
dictatorship, it is clear that the genesis of the process leading to democracy 
was rooted in widespread struggles in the labour, social and political 
spheres.39 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have analysed here a minor part of rural anti-Francoism in Spain. 
If it is true that the level of agrarian mobilization in southern Catalonia 
cannot be compared to the conflicts in cities and industrial areas during this 
same period, this study enables us to better understand the hegemony 
eventually achieved by the opposition against the dictatorship. It helps us 
understand the complexity of activist movements. The complex social 
relations that characterized the Spanish countryside as a whole, but 
especially in Catalonia, where there was a huge economic-industrial 
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development, helps us to observe closely how rural populations in the 
villages felt in relation to the dictatorship, areas where Francoism was 
supposedly very strong in its capacity to organize efficient social control. It 
may also help us to contextualise the supposed “apathy” and 
“demobilization” that many people attributed to rural populations and, 
consequently, to qualify or even discard such arguments. 
“Little everyday rebellions”, or what has also been called the 
“weapons of the weak”, prefigured more substantial actions as described 
above: they were essential for future collective actions. Furthermore, when 
these “little rebellions” turned into extended actions or, especially, when 
they were generalized and coordinated, they represented a huge problem for 
the dictatorship. The boycott of the SSA tax ended with a victory for the 
peasants despite the repression. The inability to negotiate issues that 
pertained to the working conditions and lives of many people led to the 
political conclusion that it was essential to change the policy framework 
itself.  
The actions that we analysed – supported by documentary and oral 
sources – allow us to confirm the existence of a shared peasant identity that 
was essential for an organized response to the grievances of the rural 
population. Moreover, the successes of actions that were illegal, but 
supported by the larger community, demonstrated to the workers that it was 
essential to confront and go beyond the existing structure. Gramsci wrote 
that ideas cannot live without organization, but this was particularly difficult 
under the conditions of a dictatorship. Yet despite this, a large group of 
peasants took up the fight against Francoism. The CCPP was a disciplined 
group with the clear political ideology and culture of communism. Even 
though the links with the PSUC assured the rural workers logistical 
assistance and a clear line of action, the strong communist presence drove 
away many peasants from the CCPP. Parallel actions in shared spaces, 
however, contributed to a real extension of the social base of the opposition 
and overcame the activists’ isolation. This was confirmed in the more plural 
social-political movement of the UP.  
It is interesting to pay special attention to the importance of the 
democratic assembly in this history of struggle. Under the dictatorship, the 
assembly served as an anti-repressive measure and a way to legitimize the 
actions of the movement. It was a meeting space where workers could 
openly discuss their problems and search for solutions. This helped, on the 
one hand, to legitimize collective actions and, on the other hand, to protect 
political activists through the anonymity of the crowd. It is no surprise that 
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the assembly has become the most representative aspect of direct democracy 
and a form of identity in the recent history of the workers’ and popular 
movement in Spain. 
Finally, if it is true that the opposition failed to end Francoism as 
they had planned — through a general strike that would overthrow the 
dictatorship and form a provisional government that would restore political 
autonomy to Catalonia— the truth is that social mobilization prevented the 
perpetuation of an authoritarian dictatorship after Franco’s death. The 
participation of common people fighting to improve their material 
conditions produced a profound social and political change: sites of social 
interaction, networks of political relationships and the process of collective 
self-organization helped to weaken the Francoist power. Far from being 
apathetic and demobilized, the rural population knew how to challenge and 
debilitate the social bases of the dictatorship. Far from being a secondary 
factor, the weakening of the dictatorship “from below” helps us to 
understand the political decisions taken “from above” after the death of 
Franco. 
